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CARNIVAL OF MIRRORS: LAURENCE
TRIBE'S "UNBEARABLE WRONGNESS"
Nelson Lund*
Professor Tribe has now done to me just what I claim he did
to the Supreme Court in eroG v. hsuB. 1 By repeatedly distorting
what I actually said, Unbearable Wrongnesi creates illusory targets that Professor Tribe then holds up to ridicule. 3 In the very
limited space that the editors have allotted, I could not possibly
offer point-by-point responses to his many mischaracterizations
of what I said in the two articles that he attacks. 4 Nor will I try to
catalo~ the arguments that he left unanswered in his lengthy rebuttal.
Instead, I will focus on our most significant points of disagreement: whether the Court's rationale for the decision in
Bush v. Gore suffers from an "almost embarrassing bank-

* Patrick Henry Professor of Constitutional Law and the Second Amendment
and Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
I. Laurence H. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from
its Hall of Mirrors, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 170 (2001) ("Tribe, eroG v. hsuB").
2. Laurence H. Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 Const.
Comm. 571 (2002) ("Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness").
3. Perhaps the most ridiculous thing I'm accused of saying is that Professor Tribe's
eroG v. hsuB is "unexceptional." Id. at 572 & n.3. Fortunately for me, however, what
Professor Tribe calls a "direct quotation" is an outright misquotation. In fact, I said almost the opposite, viz. that much of his essay is "quite unexceptionable." Nelson Lund,
"EQUAL PROTECTION, MY ASS!"? Bush v. Gore and Laurence Tribe's Hall of Mirrors, 19 Const. Comm. 543,544 (2002) ("Lund, "EQUAL PROTECTION ... "?").
4. For just one illustrative example, consider the following passage: "Professor
Lund attempts to dismiss the importance of Davis on the ground that it was merely a plurality opinion. Apparently, the reader is supposed to believe that, because Davis commanded no clear majority, the case is not good law. I trust Professor Lund is kidding."
Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 580 n.42 (cited in note 2). I invite the reader to compare
this passage, and the rest of footnote 42, with what I actually said in Lund, "EQUAL
PROTECTION ... "? at 553 n.35, 559-60 (cited in note 3). Nowhere did I say or imply
that the absence of a majority opinion in Davis means that the case or decision is not
"good law." Cf. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 576 & n.18 (cited in note 2) (attributing
a statement in the plurality opinion in the Casey abortion case to "the Court itself').
5. For one example, see Lund, "EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at 554-55 (cited in
note 3) (criticizing Professor Tribe's defense of the Florida court's treatment of the partial recount in Miami-Dade).
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ruptcy," and whether the Court was legally prohibited from deciding the case at all. These are the important issues, and it is
important to keep in mind that Professor Tribe's attacks on me
are significant only because he desperately needs to show that
any legal defense of the Court is silly. That is the only way to
sustain his own claim that the Court was playing a shell game in
Bush v. Gore/ or as he now says, that the Court's decision deserves to be greeted with "head-scratching incredulity." 8 Professor Tribe's claim is not just that Bush v. Gore was wrongly decided, but rather that no reasonable person could defend the
decision. That is an extraordinarily serious accusation against the
Court, and I say that the accusation is itself outrageous.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION
First, Professor Tribe ignores the distinction that I and all
the Justices have drawn between what we may think is the
"original meaning" of various constitutional provisions and what
the Court's cases say they mean. 9 Most importantly, neither I nor
the Bush v. Gore majority argued that Reynolds v. Sims was
rightly decided. 10 Notwithstanding Professor Tribe's repeated efforts to saddle me with the deep perplexities that are attributable
to the Reynolds line of cases, I have neither the power to change
the opinion that Chief Justice Warren wrote, nor the power to
overrule any decision. Unlike me, the Bush v. Gore Court did
have the power to overrule the well-settled Reynolds line of
cases. But neither Professor Tribe nor anyone else that I'm
aware of has criticized Bush v. Gore for accepting this line of
precedent.
The real issue is whether the Court applied those precedents correctly. I have argued that the decision in Bush v. Gore
6. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 573 (cited in note 2).
7. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB at 221-22 (cited in note 1) (quoted in part in Lund,
"EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at 543-44 n.2 (cited in note 3)).
8. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness. at 571(cited in note 2). See also id. at 575 (charging that "the [equal protection] holding was "not just incorrect but utterly bizarre") (emphasis in original); id. at 601 n.118 (apparently claiming that the case contained no "colorable claims for federal relief').
9. If this has contributed to my being labeled "deeply, deeply, shallow," so be it.
See id. at 572.
10. I specifically called Justice Harlan's dissent in that case "devastating and unanswered," and I explained at some length why I agreed with a good part of Professor
Tribe's analytical critique of the vote dilution theory that I say arose in and from Reynolds. Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 Cardozo L. Rev.
("Lund,
Unbearable
Rightness");
Lund,
"EQUAL
1219,
1262
(2002)
PROTECTION ... "? at 556-61 (cited in note 3).
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flows easily from the Reynolds line, and I believe I'm right about
that. But I do not claim that anyone who advances a different interpretation of the Court's equal protection precedents must be
greeted with the kind of mockery that Professor Tribe directs at
the Supreme Court and me. 11 At least since the day the Court
concluded that "the equal protection of the laws" means "the
protection of equal laws," 1 the jurisprudence of this constitutional provision has been a never-ending exercise in drawing judicially-created lines between permissible and impermissible
forms of inequality. All, or almost all, of the Court's equal protection decisions can therefore be defended with some sort of
reasoned argument, as well as criticized with some sort of reasoned argument. In this respect, Bush v. Gore is just like the
others.
But Professor Tribe has not contented himself with making
a reasoned argument against the Court's application of its equal
protection precedents. Instead, he has taken upon himself the far
more difficult burden of demonstratin¥ that Bush v. Gore was
"not just incorrect but utterly bizarre." 1 Unless he can meet that
burden, his indictment of the Court is highly irresponsible. And
he does not meet the burden. Professor Tribe's first major criticism of my defense of Bush v. Gore essentially boils down to
this: the broad principle of equal protection that I quoted from
Reynolds v. Sims 14 cannot imply that Bush v. Gore was right to
"mandate[ ] precisely drawn and completely uniform standards
for recounting electoral ballots" 15 because such a constitutional
requirement would lead to a host of inconsistencies and even abII. See Lund, "EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at553 (cited in note 3) ("The nature
of the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence has produced a huge range of
cases in which a decision either way would be neither indisputably correct nor impossible
to defend. Bush v. Gore falls within that range, though the Court's holding is extremely
easy to defend.").
12. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
13. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 575 (cited in note 2) (emphasis in original).
14. "Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means, merely
because of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable. One must be ever
aware that the Constitution forbids 'sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination."' 377 U.S. at 563 (citations omitted). As I have already explained at length,
the Reynolds opinion as a whole confirms that the Court was relying on a principle that
went well beyond the malapportioned legislative districts that were directly at issue. See
Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1244-51 (cited in note 10); Lund, "EQUAL
PROTECTION ... "? at 551-53 (cited in note 3).
15. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 572 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added). See
also id. at 586 (apparently implying that the Court and I maintain that "the Constitution
requires that all ballots be treated identically" (emphasis in original)); id. at 587-88
(claiming that the Court demanded that any right to vote for President must be "perfectly uniform").
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surdities. 16 1t is true that the Court and I both interpret Reynolds
to stand for a principle broader than the requirement of equipopulous legislative districts. So does Professor Tribe, at least
some of the tirne. 17 But neither the Court nor I interpreted Reynolds to entail the many absurdities that would no doubt follow
if it required perfect equality or complete uniformity.
Professor Tribe's argument would have considerable merit
if he had correctly described the holding in Bush v. Gore. But he
has not. Bush v. Gore pointed to several different instances of
serious, unjustified, and avoidable nonuniformity in the recount
ordered by the Florida court, and concluded that the recount order did not satisfy "the minimum requirement for nonarbitrarX
treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right." 8
The Court certainly did say that the formulation of uniform rules
was practicable and necessary, 19 but it never said that these rules
must be "precisely drawn" or "completely" uniform. Whether
one agrees with the Court's equal protection analysis or not, nobody should put these words into the Court's mouth, as Professor Tribe does, and then mock the Court for having said something utterly bizarre and foolish.
Recognizing that "the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities," 20 Bush v.
Gore refrained from trying to elaborate a comprehensive set of
rules for determining exactly how much and what kinds of nonuniformity are constitutionally proscribed in each of the various
factual contexts that can arise in counting ballots. I think the
Court's decision to rule narrowly made good sense, for reasons
that I have already explained in detail. 21 Someone else might ar16. See, e.g., id. at 587 (" ... Bush v. Gore appears to put states in a Catch-22: the
failure to specify a uniform statewide substandard for recounting may risk invalidation
under the 'arbitrariness' principle, while the decision to specify such a substandard may
inadvertently treat ballots unequally.") (emphasis in original).
17. See, e.g., Tribe, eroG v. hsuB at 224 (cited in note 1) ("No one doubts that the
Reynolds line would prevent a state from adopting a system in which those who tally machine-rejected ballots manually are instructed to toss out ballots with ambiguous marks
indicating an intent to vote for Bush but to count all the votes for Gore."). See also Lund,
"EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at 550-53 (cited in note 3) (discussing Professor Tribe's
inconsistent statements about the breadth of Reynolds' reach).
18. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,105 (2000).
19. ld. at 106.
20. Id. at 109.
21. Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1267-69 (cited in note 10). It could hardly be
maintained that the Court had some kind of obligation to answer the myriad questions
that undoubtedly do remain open after Bush v. Gore. It is typical, rather than unusual,
for equal protection rulings to generate many more questions than they answer. Familiar
examples include Reynolds v. Sims and Brown v. Board of Education.
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gue, without embarrassing himself, that the Court should have
provided more detailed guidance for future cases. But that is not
the argument that Professor Tribe advances.
Instead, he insists that the Court was obliged to consider,
sua sponte, hypothetical equal protection objections to the underlying count in Florida, and then rule on the basis of "facts"
that had never even been argued to the Court, let alone tested in
a trial. His principal argument, as I understand it, is that the underlying count was infected with uniformity problems at least as
serious as those that the Supreme Court identified in the recount
ordered by the Florida court. 22 It may or may not be true that a
properly litigated challenge to the underlying count should have
resulted in its being invalidated under the equal protection standards relied on in Bush v. Gore. But we will never know, because Gore's legal team never even argued (let alone proved)
that the underlying count suffered from uniformity problems
comparable to those in the court-ordered recount. 23
One must ask why the brief that Professor Tribe filed in the
Supreme Court didn't articulate such an objection-one which
Professor Tribe now finds so compelling-in response to the
Bush team's equal protection arguments. Perhaps it had something to do with the fact that Professor Tribe's brief did object to
allowing his opponents to challenge the underlying count. 24 But
let us assume that Gore's legal team could not have been expected to realize the importance of comparing the nonuniformity
in the court-ordered recount with that in the underlying count
until after the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore. Even on that
generous assumption, Gore got that chance after the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court:
he could have argued to the Florida court that equal protection
problems in the underlying count required a new recount consis22. See Tribe, eroG v. hsuB at 254-63 (cited in note 1).
23. In support of his suggestion that this issue was somehow before the Supreme
Court, Professor Tribe cites only an amicus curiae brief. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at
589 n.79 (cited in note 2). I'll spare the reader a disquisition on the differences between
parties and amici. Quite apart from that issue, the amicus brief cited by Professor Tribe
made no effort to compare the inequalities in the underlying count with those in the
court-ordered recount. Indeed, and notwithstanding Professor Tribe's description, the
brief did not discuss the Florida election dispute at all.
24. Brief of Respondents at 35, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), ("Petitioners'
Fourteenth Amendment arguments rest principally on the assertion that, if the manual
count proceeds, similar ballots will be treated dissimilarly in different parts of the State.
We note that, insofar as this argument is directed at pre-contest tabulations, it is out of
place here; petitioners should have raised such claims in an election contest of their
own.").
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tent with the equal protection standards recognized in Bush v.
Gore.
Professor Tribe does have a response of sorts, which is a
corollary to his second major objection to the Court's decision.
He claims that there was no remand, and the Court decided "to
halt the entire political and legal process set in motion and declare by fiat an end to the presidential election." 25 Or, in an alternative formulation, that the Court deserves strong criticism
for its "particularly inexplicable failure to grasp the inconsistency between its own equal protection holding and the remedy
on which it settled. "26
I agree that it would have been inappropriate for the Supreme Court to forbid the Florida court to attempt a new recount comporting with equal protection standards. The principal
legal obstacle to such an attempt was the Florida court's own
conclusion that state law set a deadline of December 12 (the
very date of the Supreme Court's decision). That deadline was
based on a questionable interpretation of the state statutes, and
the Florida court should have been permitted to reconsider its
interpretation of state law on remand.
Once again, however, Professor Tribe's facially plausible
objection to what the Court did is based entirely on attributing
to the Court something it never said or implied. Contrary to Professor Tribe's repeated misstatements, there was indeed a remand.27 And contrary to Professor Tribe's undefended assumption, the Supreme Court nowhere forbade the Florida court from
ordering a new recount. I have already explained and defended
this aspect of the Court's decision at great length, as Professor
Tribe is well aware. 28 His response is a footnote in which he says
25.

Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 588 (cited in note 2) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 573.
27. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111 ("The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion."). See Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 589 (cited in note 2) (alluding to the
"woeful inadequacy of the Court's explanation for shutting down the recount rather than
remanding the case to the Florida Supreme Court"); id. at 589 ("Under Lund's oneperson, one-vote theory, the only constitutionally permissible remedy was a remand.").
28. Professor Tribe says that my "most recent work studiously avoids any mention
of the (remedy] issue." Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 589 (cited in note 2). This is untrue, as anyone can see by turning back to page 545 of this issue of Constitutional Commentary. Not only did I mention the issue, I pointed out that I disagreed with Professor
Tribe's claim that the Supreme Court forbade the Florida court from ordering a new recount on remand. And I gave the reader a citation to a lengthy discussion of my reasons
for disagreeing with him. Lund, "EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at 545 n.7 (cited in note
3) (discussing and citing Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1270-78 (cited in note 10)). It is
true that I did not ask the editors of Constitutional Commentary to reprint that lengthy
26.
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"Au contraire," followed by a selective quotation from the
Court's opinion. 29
"Au contraire" is not an argument. Nor does it, or the quotation on which Professor Tribe relies, in any way refute my contrary arguments. In language omitted by Professor Tribe, the
Court said that it could not remand for a new recount "[b]ecause
the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature
intended" to set a deadline of December 12.30 The Supreme
Court was perfect!~ correct to defer to the state court's interpretation of state law. 1 More important, however, the Court simply
did not forbid the state court to change its interpretation of state
law on remand, nor did the Court forbid a new recount based on
such a reinterpretation. Professor Tribe's claim that the Supreme
Court forbade the Florida court from ordering a new recount is a
canard, plain and simple.
Professor Tribe's co-counsel in Bush v. Gore, David Boies
and Ronald Klain, have both acknowledged that the Supreme
Court's opinion did not foreclose the Florida court from ordering a new recount. 32 Professor Tribe should join them in doing
discussion in this issue of the journal. Nor will I ask them to do so now. But Professor
Tribe knows about this discussion. See Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 589 n.78 (cited in
note 2).
29. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 589 n.78 (cited in note 2).
30. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111:
Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature intended to obtain the safeharbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5, Justice BREYER's
proposed remedy-remanding to the Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of
a constitutionally proper contest until December 18-contemplates action in
violation of the Florida Election Code, and hence could not be part of an "appropriate" order authorized by Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001).
Professor Tribe should have been well aware of the importance of the language that he
omitted when quoting part of this passage, for I had already objected to its being ignored
by another commentator. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1277 n.l82 (cited in note
10).
31. Professor Tribe is mistaken to say that my defense of Bush v. Gore somehow
compels me to conclude that "deferring to the Florida Supreme Court's December 12
deadline would plainly violate the Fourteenth Amendment." Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 589 (cited in note 2). The Court was not obliged to somehow anticipate and accept Professor Tribe's unlitigated, post hoc claims, which were never presented to the
Court, about a "dizzying array of arbitrary inequalities," id., in the underlying count.
32. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1277 n.l85 (cited in note 10) (cited in Lund,
"EQUAL PROTECTION ... "? at 545 n.7 (cited in note 3)). See also 3 Engage: The
Journal of the Federalist Society's Practice Groups 80-81 (Aug. 2002) (transcript of
Lund/Kiain colloquy), where Mr. Klain agreed "as a legal matter" that the Florida court
could have ordered a new recount on remand, while suggesting (quite reasonably in my
view) that "as a practical matter" the Florida court was not likely to have accepted an
invitation from the Gore team to do so:
Nelson, I agree that the opinion did not preclude the possibility that the
Florida Supreme Court could have had a remand proceeding and could have
determined that the Supreme Court's conclusion in its opinion that the Decem-
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so. That will probably not happen, however, because Professor
Tribe's whole complex edifice of argumentation collapses once
one recognizes that he has again attributed to the Court a decision which does sound outrageous but which the Court never
made. This point is sufficiently important that a special word of
caution is required. 33 By agreement, Professor Tribe will get the
last word in this exchange of views in Constitutional Commentary. If he uses that opportunity to challenge the detailed arguments that I presented on this issue in Unbearable Rightness, I
hope that interested readers will carefully compare whatever he
says about my arguments with what I actually said. 34
II. JUSTICIABILITY
On justiciability, Professor Tribe has now abandoned the
position that I called "spectacularly indefensible." Which is
good. It would have been even better had he returned to the position that he took during the Bush v. Gore litigation. Unfortunately, he has now invented yet a third theory, which is entirely
new and which the Supreme Court could certainly not have been
expected to anticipate.
Space constraints preclude a critique of Professor Tribe's
latest position, which essentially seeks to conflate the "passive
virtues" theory of judicial restraint to which Justice Breyer ap-

ber 12th deadline was wrong. I absolutely agree with you that that possibility
was open, and, in fact, on the night of December 12th, a number of us on the
Gore team stayed up all night and wrote just such a brief inviting the Florida
Supreme Court to do just that.
I think as a practical matter, though, in this context, our view was that the
Florida Supreme Court had gotten, you know, two increasingly intense candygrams from the U.S. Supreme Court and the second one seemed to have the
word "stop" written on it in really big letters. It was our view that the Florida
Supreme Court, which had divided four-three the past time around, was really
not that interested in seeing us there one more time.
So I take your point that as a legal matter, it was open to the Florida Supreme Court to write an opinion that said, "we know the Supreme Court said
December 12th was the deadline, we know everyone in America thinks this is
over now, but in fact, December 16th is the deadline and we're going to start
the counting again." You know, it just seemed like the Supreme Court was
sending a very strong signal not to do that.
33. Indeed, this issue reappears in an important way even in the context of the political question doctrine, discussed below. Under Professor Tribe's new theory of the political question doctrine, it seems that if the Court had "rule[d) out remedies that prematurely short-circuited the political process, and had remanded the case to the Florida
Supreme Court to conduct a manual recount with uniform standards, it would at least
have remained somewhat faithful to our constitutional tradition." Tribe, Unbearable
Wrongness at 602 (cited in note 2).
34. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1270-78 (cited in note 10).
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pealed 35 with the legal doctrine of nonjusticiable political questions.36 It is worth stressing, however, the extent of Professor
Tribe's concession. Not only does he admit that he cannot defend the theory I attacked, he also seems to concede that his new
theory has never previously been articulated by anyone. Most
important, he now says that "it seems implausible that any resolution of the ultimate legal battle over the propriety of the
Court's intervention in the face of the political question doctrine
could be described as plainly right or as plainly wrong. "37 In light
of this statement, I would like to think that Professor Tribe will
withdraw his sarcastic remarks about the Court's failure to address a justiciability issue never raised by the parties, 38 and perhaps also his claim that the five "Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority have little but disdain for Congress as a serious partner in
the constitutional enterprise, and not much patience with 'We
the People' as the ultimate source of sovereignty in this republic. "39
One other point deserves to be emphasized. Contrary to
what Professor Tribe would have us believe, 40 Justices Souter
and Breyer absolutely did not say, imply, or even suggest that
Bush v. Gore was nonjusticiable. Neither of them ever used the
word "justiciable" or any of its cognates. Neither of them ever
referred to the "political question doctrine." And neither of
them cited any of the innumerable cases from this line of prece35. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 57-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing a Harlan
Stone dissent and an extrajudicial remark by Louis Brandeis that was quoted in Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch).
36. Here again, and contrary to the insinuation in Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at
592 n.88, I have respected the distinction between my interpretation of the Constitution
and the Supreme Court's case law. I believe that the Constitution can plausibly be interpreted to render cases like Bush v. Gore nonjusticiable. Whether it should be so interpreted seems to me a difficult question, and I have not been able to arrive at a settled
opinion about that issue. The case law, however, is clear enough: McPherson v. Blacker
answered the question, and that decision has not been overruled. The skimpy reasoning
in the McPherson opinion is quite inadequate, and I have never said that the case was
correctly decided. On the contrary, I have repeatedly cautioned against inferring that I
think it was rightly decided. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness at 1234 n.53, 1254 n.l13
(cited in note 10). As with the equal protection issue, my claim has been that the Court
correctly applied its own precedents, and Professor Tribe does not contend that the
Court was obliged to overrule McPherson.
37. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 593 (cited in note 2).
38. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB at 279 (cited in note 1) (quoted in Lund, "EQUAL
PROTECTION ... "? at 562-63 (cited in note 3)).
39. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB at 290 (cited in note 1) (quoted in Lund, "EQUAL
PROTECTION ... "? at 569 (cited in note 3)).
40. See Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 603 (cited in note 2) ("Contrary to Lund's
utterly bizarre assertion, Justices Breyer and Souter plainly invoked the political question
doctrine.").
•
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dents. Whatever kinship their position may have with Professor
Tribe's newly minted "political process variant" of the political
question doctrine, it is simply untrue that Souter or Breyer relied
on what Professor Tribe calls "the traditional doctrine." 41
Both Justices plainly did believe that the Court should not
have exercised its discretion to grant certiorari in this case, and I
have no doubt that they would have been pleased to see the writ
dismissed as improvidently granted. But they never said that the
Court had violated the Constitution or any other legal rule by
the very act of deciding the case. 42 Professor Tribe's effort to
suggest otherwise requires him to conflate the doctrine of nonjusticiable political questions (which Souter and Breyer did not
invoke) with arguments (which Souter and Breyer clearly did
make) about the proper exercise of judicial discretion.
CONCLUSION
As in most important constitutional cases, there was room
in Bush v. Gore for reasonable disagreement about the best interpretation of the applicable precedents. I think it was a very
easy case, but my strong objections to Professor Tribe's position
are not based on that conclusion. Rather, I object to the extravagant terms in which he has denounced the Court, and to his
claim that no reasonable defense of the Court's decision is possible. He is able to make that extremely serious charge sound
plausible only by attributing to the Court absurd and irresponsible positions that it never took, and thereby creating an illusion
of judicial outlandishness. Professor Tribe continues to paint the
decision in this case as an outrage, and that is simply insupportable.

41. See id. at 604 (" ... Justice Souter's argument invokes both the traditional doctrine and what I have called its political process variant"). Justice Ginsburg did allude to
the "traditional doctrine," but only in criticizing Chief Justice Rehnquist's Article II
analysis in his separate concurrence. 531 U.S. at 141-42 & n.2.
42. Once again, Professor Tribe gets an assist from a misleading use of ellipses. See
Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 605 (cited in note 2), where a careful review of the quotation shows that Justice Breyer did not say that it was "legally wrong" for the Court to
resolve the equal protection issue. Although Professor Tribe italicizes the term "legally
wrong" in the quotation, Justice Breyer was not speaking there about the Court's decision to resolve the equal protection issue, but rather about what he believed was the
remedy the Court ordered. Whether or not one agrees with Breyer's characterization of
the remedy in the case, and whether or not one agrees with Breyer's prudential arguments against deciding the case at all, the fact remains that neither he nor Justice Souter
said or implied that the case was nonjusticiable.

